

SOVIET AGRICULTURE PROSPECTS: 1956-1960

- "I see particular class
my guilt + responsibility for unsat. state of affairs in"*
I. Malenkov resignation statement, with ad- *A*

mission "guilt" for agricultural failures,
highlights agriculture as perhaps USSR's
single most urgent problem.

A. In face of 10% population rise since
'38 (3 million yearly, now), Soviet
agricultural output was up only 3%
above the prewar level (per capita
daily calories [1953-54]-2,700, com-
pared with 2,900 in 1938-39: a de-
cline of 6%).

B. Compared with US standards, Soviet
in amount
diet--while adequate--is very starch-
heavy, with little meat, milk, fats
and oils.

C. USSR's slow agricultural growth
seriously threatens retard growth of

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐ economy, by lowering labor
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failure of USSR's present agricultural plans may have important bearing on stability of Soviet leadership in next several years.

A. Khrushchev closely identified with two boldest elements these plans--

1. "New Lands" program: expanding wheat acreage onto more than 70 million acres marginal land in Siberia and Kazakhstan by 1960 (roughly equal to Arizona).
2. Corn acreage expansion drive: from present 10 million to 70 million acres by 1960.

B. Both are major gambles because of weather and soil conditions.

1. For wheat production, soil and climate in much of "new lands" area is less favorable than in Soviet Ukraine, which--

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about same as US Dakotas.

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2. We are all aware of crop un-

certainities in Dakotas, due un-
certain rainfall.

3. Precisely same uncertainties exist
in Ukraine's rich black soil
regions.

4. In "new lands," situation even
more risky--crop failures may be
expected two out of every five
years.

C. Although Khrushchev casts a longing
eye toward US corn-hog production
methods, USSR actually has no hope
of developing yields comparable to
US corn belt, where soil, climatic
conditions exceptionally favorable.

1. Major Soviet plans for 1955-60 ("new lands"
and corn expansion) envision doubling of
both grain and livestock products output
by 1960.

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A. To achieve meat products doubling

by 1960, Khrushchev logically has placed primary emphasis on pigs, which mature faster than cattle. Pork production is to go up 100 percent, beef production 70 percent.

B. In addition to climate risks, both grain programs are highly expensive, need heavy investment of machinery and manpower.

C. Current CIA estimates (which assume normal weather): by 1960, Soviet grain and livestock output--at the very maximum--will be only 20-30% above 1954 (in contrast Kremlin-scheduled increase of 100%).

IV. Under Malenkov, program for increasing agricultural output emphasized increased yields per acre, through intensified farming, increased peasant incentives.

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88% increase in fertilizer production by '55. At end of '54, production was only 45% above '50.

B. On incentive side, tax reductions, price adjustments, and slight increases in availability of consumer goods have been reported.

1. Question--in simple terms--is whether incentives strong enough to get collectivized peasant out of bed at 2:00 a.m. to tend a sick collectivized cow (as he probably would if the cow were his own).

2. No indication up to now that the peasant has radically changed his negative attitude towards collective farms.

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V. While present Soviet regime has not re-
jected policy of increasing agricultural
production in the traditional areas,
major emphasis today is on grandiose
expansion schemes.

- A. Expansion intended to increase output
much more quickly, although probably
at greater long-run cost, than
Malenkov program.
- B. Success or failure of the expansion
schemes--which we will be watching
closely--may thus determine how near
the USSR will come to achieving its
agricultural goals in the next five
years.

VI. While USSR is engaged in costly expansion
gambles--a program reaffirming historic
Soviet policy of economic self-sufficiency--
no help can be expected from rest of Orbit,
which is worse off at present than Soviet

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important crop) was 2% below '53, despite small Soviet gains.

1. In USSR, grain output in '54 was about 5% over relatively poor level, because almost spectacular favorable weather in "new lands" more than offset effects of Ukrainian drought. Meat production in '54, reflecting low grain levels recent years, was only 2% above

2. In Satellites and China, however, the drop in grain output in '54, to poor weather and flood, brought total for Bloc down below '53.

B. Total Bloc agriculture production (grains, plus other commodities) was slightly poorer in '54 than in '53.

However, except for North Vietnam, in some areas of China, where temporary famine may occur this spring, food supply in the Bloc this year (drawn from '54 harvests) will be adequate.

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BACKGROUND - SOVIET AGRICULTURE

I. 1938 Yields:

Grains - 104% of 1950

Meat and Fats - 129% of 1950

Milk - 149% of 1950

Corn
(Acreage) - 127% of 1950

II. Comparative figures 1938 - 1950:

Grains - 88.6 *mt/tons* 85.0

Meat and Fats - 3,980,000 *tons* 3,075,000

Milk - 34,100,000 *tons* 22,900,000

Corn
(Acreage) - 3.8 *mill/hect* 3.0